mirror of
https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs.git
synced 2026-06-13 23:36:45 +03:00
Chris Lu
d951a8df5a
* feat(iam): STS web-identity AWS-fidelity polish - OIDC discovery via .well-known/openid-configuration; falls back to /.well-known/jwks.json when discovery is absent. Reject discovery docs whose issuer claim does not match the configured issuer to defend against issuer-substitution. - ComputeParentUser derives a stable per-identity hash from (sub, iss). Surface as aws:userid in the request context and as a parent_user claim in the session JWT so per-user state survives token rotation. - Per-role MaxSessionDuration (3600..43200) clamps requested DurationSeconds before the STS service applies its own caps. - Tighten RoleSessionName to the AWS contract: 2..64 chars from [\w+=,.@-]. - Populate PackedPolicySize in AssumeRole / AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity / AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity responses as a percentage of the 2048-byte inline session policy budget. * fix(iam): leave omitted DurationSeconds nil so STS default applies capDurationByRole was substituting the role's MaxSessionDuration when the caller omitted DurationSeconds entirely. AWS returns the configured default (typically 1 hour) in that case, not the role's upper bound — a 12h MaxSessionDuration shouldn't silently make every no-duration assume-role mint a 12h session. Return nil when requested is nil; let the downstream calculateSessionDuration in the STS service apply its TokenDuration default. The role-max upper bound still clamps when the request arrives with a concrete value above the cap. Addresses gemini high-priority review on PR #9318. * fix(iam): synchronize OIDCProvider JWKS cache fields jwksCache, jwksFetchedAt, resolvedJWKSUri, and discoveryFailed are mutated lazily on the first token-validate call and refreshed afterwards on TTL expiry. Multiple S3 requests can land here in parallel, so the writes were racing against subsequent reads on every other goroutine. resolvedJWKSUri/discoveryFailed inherited the same un-protected pattern when discovery shipped. Add sync.RWMutex; getPublicKey takes the read lock for the common cache-hit path and promotes to the write lock for misses + refreshes. fetchJWKSLocked / resolveJWKSUriLocked assume the write lock is held by the caller; fetchJWKS keeps the test-friendly entry point that acquires the lock itself. Addresses gemini high-priority review on PR #9318. * fix(iam): trim trailing slash + retry discovery after transient failure Two OIDC discovery edge cases reviewers flagged: 1. Issuer comparison was sensitive to trailing slashes. resolveJWKSUri trims them when building the discovery URL, but the doc.Issuer ↔ p.config.Issuer check did not, so an IDP whose issuer claim drops or adds the slash relative to the configured value would be falsely rejected. Trim a single trailing slash on each side before comparing. 2. discoveryFailed flipped to true on any error and stayed there for the process lifetime. A transient 5xx at startup permanently locked the provider into the /.well-known/jwks.json fallback. Reset the flag at the top of fetchJWKSLocked when no URI has been cached yet, so each JWKS refresh (typically once per TTL = 1h) reattempts discovery. Successful discovery remains cached via resolvedJWKSUri so we don't pay the discovery RTT on every refresh. Addresses gemini security-medium + medium reviews on PR #9318. * fix(iam): require non-empty issuer in OIDC discovery doc The previous "doc.Issuer != "" && ..." guard let a discovery document that omitted the issuer field bypass the issuer-mismatch check entirely, letting the doc steer fetchJWKS at any URL it provided. OIDC Discovery 1.0 §3 mandates the issuer field; treat missing as a hard failure same as mismatched. Trailing-slash equivalence still applies. Adds TestDiscoveryRejectsMissingIssuer alongside the existing TestDiscoveryRejectsIssuerMismatch via a new omitDiscoveryIssuer toggle on fakeIDP.
48 lines
1.6 KiB
Go
48 lines
1.6 KiB
Go
package s3api
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import "testing"
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func TestValidateRoleSessionName(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []struct {
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name string
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input string
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wantErr bool
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// wantCode is checked only when wantErr is true
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wantCode STSErrorCode
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}{
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{"empty rejected", "", true, STSErrMissingParameter},
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{"single char rejected (below min len 2)", "a", true, STSErrInvalidParameterValue},
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{"min length 2 accepted", "ab", false, ""},
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{"plain ascii accepted", "session-name_1", false, ""},
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{"all special chars allowed", "+=,.@-", false, ""},
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{"email-style accepted", "alice@example.com", false, ""},
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{"max length 64 accepted", string(make([]byte, 64)), true, STSErrInvalidParameterValue}, // zero bytes -> invalid charset
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{"max length 64 valid charset accepted", repeat('a', 64), false, ""},
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{"length 65 rejected", repeat('a', 65), true, STSErrInvalidParameterValue},
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{"space rejected", "alice bob", true, STSErrInvalidParameterValue},
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{"slash rejected", "alice/bob", true, STSErrInvalidParameterValue},
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{"colon rejected", "alice:bob", true, STSErrInvalidParameterValue},
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{"unicode rejected", "alicé", true, STSErrInvalidParameterValue},
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}
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for _, tc := range cases {
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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code, err := validateRoleSessionName(tc.input)
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gotErr := err != nil
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if gotErr != tc.wantErr {
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t.Fatalf("err mismatch: got=%v want=%v (err=%v)", gotErr, tc.wantErr, err)
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}
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if tc.wantErr && code != tc.wantCode {
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t.Fatalf("code mismatch: got=%s want=%s", code, tc.wantCode)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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func repeat(b byte, n int) string {
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out := make([]byte, n)
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for i := range out {
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out[i] = b
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}
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return string(out)
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}
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