* fix(volume): add authentication to destructive gRPC admin endpoints Three destructive VolumeServer gRPC endpoints (DeleteCollection, VolumeDelete, VolumeServerLeave) had no authentication checks, unlike their HTTP counterparts which are protected by the Guard whitelist. Add IsWhiteListed(host) to security.Guard and a checkGrpcAdminAuth helper on VolumeServer that extracts the peer IP from gRPC context and validates it against the guard whitelist. Gate all three endpoints behind this check. * fix(volume): tolerate unparseable gRPC peer address in admin auth check S3 Filer Group integration tests were failing with PermissionDenied "bad peer address: address @: missing port in address" when DeleteCollection ran across the in-process gRPC connection between filer and volume server — the peer addr surfaces as "@" there and net.SplitHostPort can't parse it. The check rejected before IsWhiteListed could exercise its allow-all path for empty-whitelist deployments. Hand the raw peer string to IsWhiteListed when SplitHostPort fails. With no whitelist configured (the test environment's mode) it accepts; with a whitelist configured the unparseable host won't match anything and the call still gets denied as it should. Adds three regression tests for IsWhiteListed pinning the empty-config allow-all, populated-list reject-unknown, and signing-key-only allow- all branches that the gRPC admin helper relies on. * refactor(security): dedup checkWhiteList through IsWhiteListed The HTTP-side checkWhiteList and the gRPC-side IsWhiteListed had the same lookup logic in two places; future drift was just a matter of time. Have checkWhiteList delegate so the membership semantics live in exactly one function. Behaviour is unchanged: the new path still returns nil for isEmptyWhiteList (signing-key-only mode) and still rejects unknown hosts when a whitelist is configured. Addresses gemini medium review on PR #8876. * fix(volume): protect remaining state-altering gRPC admin endpoints DeleteCollection, VolumeDelete, and VolumeServerLeave were the truly-destructive endpoints, but AllocateVolume, VolumeMount, VolumeUnmount, VolumeConfigure, VolumeMarkReadonly, and VolumeMarkWritable also modify server state and should sit behind the same whitelist gate. Read-only endpoints (VolumeStatus, VolumeServerStatus, VolumeNeedleStatus, Ping) stay open. The check is a no-op when no whitelist is configured (the default), so existing deployments keep working; operators who lock down their volume servers via guard.white_list now get consistent coverage. Addresses gemini security-high review on PR #8876. * fix(volume): typed peer addr + audit log for gRPC admin auth Prefer a typed *net.TCPAddr when extracting the peer IP — string parsing was already a fallback for the in-process case but using the typed form first is cleaner and skips an unnecessary parse on the common path. Log failed authorization attempts at V(0) so an operator running with a whitelist sees the host that was rejected (and the raw remote address in case the IP lookup itself was the failure mode), matching what the HTTP Guard already does. Addresses gemini medium review on PR #8876. * fix(volume): protect vacuum + scrub + EC-shards-delete admin endpoints Five more master/admin-driven destructive operations live outside volume_grpc_admin.go and were missing the same whitelist gate: - VacuumVolumeCompact, VacuumVolumeCommit, VacuumVolumeCleanup - ScrubVolume - VolumeEcShardsDelete VacuumVolumeCheck stays open (read-only). BatchDelete also stays open: it's the data-plane multi-object delete called from the S3 API and filer, not an admin operation; gating it would break ordinary S3 DeleteObjects calls. Addresses gemini security-high review on PR #8876. * fix(volume): simplify no-peer-info branch in gRPC admin auth The IsWhiteListed("") fallback was defending against a scenario that doesn't actually arise — real gRPC connections always populate peer info. Drop the branch and just deny when peer info is missing, which is the safer default and matches "if we don't know who the caller is, refuse". * fix(volume-rust): mirror gRPC admin auth on the rust volume server The rust volume server has the same set of destructive admin endpoints as the Go side and the same Guard infrastructure, but nothing was wired together — every endpoint accepted unauthenticated calls regardless of guard configuration. Same vulnerability class the Go fix on this PR closes; this commit closes it on the rust side too so the two stacks stay aligned. Adds VolumeGrpcService::check_grpc_admin_auth that pulls the peer SocketAddr off the tonic Request and runs Guard::check_whitelist on its IP, then applies the helper to the same set the Go side covers: DeleteCollection, AllocateVolume, VolumeMount, VolumeUnmount, VolumeDelete, VolumeMarkReadonly, VolumeMarkWritable, VolumeConfigure, VacuumVolumeCompact, VacuumVolumeCommit, VacuumVolumeCleanup, VolumeServerLeave, ScrubVolume, VolumeEcShardsDelete. Read-only endpoints stay open; BatchDelete stays open as a data-plane multi-object delete.
SeaweedFS Volume Server (Rust)
A drop-in replacement for the SeaweedFS Go volume server, rewritten in Rust. It uses binary-compatible storage formats (.dat, .idx, .vif) and speaks the same HTTP and gRPC protocols, so it works with an unmodified Go master server.
Building
Requires Rust 1.75+ (2021 edition).
cd seaweed-volume
cargo build --release
The binary is produced at target/release/seaweed-volume.
Running
Start a Go master server first, then point the Rust volume server at it:
# Minimal
seaweed-volume --port 8080 --master localhost:9333 --dir /data/vol1 --max 7
# Multiple data directories
seaweed-volume --port 8080 --master localhost:9333 \
--dir /mnt/ssd1,/mnt/ssd2 --max 100,100 --disk ssd
# With datacenter/rack topology
seaweed-volume --port 8080 --master localhost:9333 --dir /data/vol1 --max 7 \
--dataCenter dc1 --rack rack1
# With JWT authentication
seaweed-volume --port 8080 --master localhost:9333 --dir /data/vol1 --max 7 \
--securityFile /etc/seaweedfs/security.toml
# With TLS (configured in security.toml via [https.volume] and [grpc.volume] sections)
seaweed-volume --port 8080 --master localhost:9333 --dir /data/vol1 --max 7 \
--securityFile /etc/seaweedfs/security.toml
Common flags
| Flag | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
--port |
8080 |
HTTP listen port |
--port.grpc |
port+10000 |
gRPC listen port |
--master |
localhost:9333 |
Comma-separated master server addresses |
--dir |
/tmp |
Comma-separated data directories |
--max |
8 |
Max volumes per directory (comma-separated) |
--ip |
auto-detect | Server IP / identifier |
--ip.bind |
same as --ip |
Bind address |
--dataCenter |
Datacenter name | |
--rack |
Rack name | |
--disk |
Disk type tag: hdd, ssd, or custom |
|
--index |
memory |
Needle map type: memory, leveldb, leveldbMedium, leveldbLarge |
--readMode |
proxy |
Non-local read mode: local, proxy, redirect |
--fileSizeLimitMB |
256 |
Max upload file size |
--minFreeSpace |
1 (percent) |
Min free disk space before marking volumes read-only |
--securityFile |
Path to security.toml for JWT keys and TLS certs |
|
--metricsPort |
0 (disabled) |
Prometheus metrics endpoint port |
--whiteList |
Comma-separated IPs with write permission | |
--preStopSeconds |
10 |
Graceful drain period before shutdown |
--compactionMBps |
0 (unlimited) |
Compaction I/O rate limit |
--pprof |
false |
Enable pprof HTTP handlers |
Set RUST_LOG=debug (or trace, info, warn) for log level control.
Set SEAWEED_WRITE_QUEUE=1 to enable batched async write processing.
Features
- Binary compatible -- reads and writes the same
.dat/.idx/.viffiles as the Go server; seamless migration with no data conversion. - HTTP + gRPC -- full implementation of the volume server HTTP API and all gRPC RPCs including streaming operations (copy, tail, incremental copy, vacuum).
- Master heartbeat -- bidirectional streaming heartbeat with the Go master server; volume and EC shard registration, leader failover, graceful shutdown deregistration.
- JWT authentication -- signing key configuration via
security.tomlwith token source precedence (query > header > cookie), file_id claims validation, and separate read/write keys. - TLS -- HTTPS for the HTTP API and mTLS for gRPC, configured through
security.toml. - Erasure coding -- Reed-Solomon EC shard management: mount/unmount, read, rebuild, copy, delete, and shard-to-volume reconstruction.
- S3 remote storage --
FetchAndWriteNeedlereads from any S3-compatible backend (AWS, MinIO, Wasabi, Backblaze, etc.) and writes locally. SupportsVolumeTierMoveDatToRemote/FromRemotefor tiered storage. - Needle map backends -- in-memory HashMap, LevelDB (via
rusty-leveldb), or redb (pure Rust disk-backed) needle maps. - Image processing -- on-the-fly resize/crop, JPEG EXIF orientation auto-fix, WebP support.
- Streaming reads -- large files (>1MB) are streamed via
spawn_blockingto avoid blocking the async runtime. - Auto-compression -- compressible file types (text, JSON, CSS, JS, SVG, etc.) are gzip-compressed on upload.
- Prometheus metrics -- counters, histograms, and gauges exported at a dedicated metrics port; optional push gateway support.
- Graceful shutdown -- SIGINT/SIGTERM handling with configurable
preStopSecondsdrain period.
Testing
Rust unit tests
cd seaweed-volume
cargo test
Go integration tests
The Go test suite can target either the Go or Rust volume server via the VOLUME_SERVER_IMPL environment variable:
# Run all HTTP + gRPC integration tests against the Rust server
VOLUME_SERVER_IMPL=rust go test -v -count=1 -timeout 1200s \
./test/volume_server/grpc/... ./test/volume_server/http/...
# Run a single test
VOLUME_SERVER_IMPL=rust go test -v -count=1 -timeout 60s \
-run "TestName" ./test/volume_server/http/...
# Run S3 remote storage tests
VOLUME_SERVER_IMPL=rust go test -v -count=1 -timeout 180s \
-run "TestFetchAndWriteNeedle" ./test/volume_server/grpc/...
Load testing
A load test harness is available at test/volume_server/loadtest/. See that directory for usage instructions and scenarios.
Architecture
The server runs three listeners concurrently:
- HTTP (Axum 0.7) -- admin and public routers for file upload/download, status, and stats endpoints.
- gRPC (Tonic 0.12) -- all
VolumeServerRPCs from the SeaweedFS protobuf definition. - Metrics (optional) -- Prometheus scrape endpoint on a separate port.
Key source modules:
| Path | Description |
|---|---|
src/main.rs |
Entry point, server startup, signal handling |
src/config.rs |
CLI parsing and configuration resolution |
src/server/volume_server.rs |
HTTP router setup and middleware |
src/server/handlers.rs |
HTTP request handlers (read, write, delete, status) |
src/server/grpc_server.rs |
gRPC service implementation |
src/server/heartbeat.rs |
Master heartbeat loop |
src/storage/volume.rs |
Volume read/write/delete logic |
src/storage/needle.rs |
Needle (file entry) serialization |
src/storage/store.rs |
Multi-volume store management |
src/security.rs |
JWT validation and IP whitelist guard |
src/remote_storage/ |
S3 remote storage backend |
See DEV_PLAN.md for the full development history and feature checklist.