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* feat(iam): STS web-identity AWS-fidelity polish - OIDC discovery via .well-known/openid-configuration; falls back to /.well-known/jwks.json when discovery is absent. Reject discovery docs whose issuer claim does not match the configured issuer to defend against issuer-substitution. - ComputeParentUser derives a stable per-identity hash from (sub, iss). Surface as aws:userid in the request context and as a parent_user claim in the session JWT so per-user state survives token rotation. - Per-role MaxSessionDuration (3600..43200) clamps requested DurationSeconds before the STS service applies its own caps. - Tighten RoleSessionName to the AWS contract: 2..64 chars from [\w+=,.@-]. - Populate PackedPolicySize in AssumeRole / AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity / AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity responses as a percentage of the 2048-byte inline session policy budget. * fix(iam): leave omitted DurationSeconds nil so STS default applies capDurationByRole was substituting the role's MaxSessionDuration when the caller omitted DurationSeconds entirely. AWS returns the configured default (typically 1 hour) in that case, not the role's upper bound — a 12h MaxSessionDuration shouldn't silently make every no-duration assume-role mint a 12h session. Return nil when requested is nil; let the downstream calculateSessionDuration in the STS service apply its TokenDuration default. The role-max upper bound still clamps when the request arrives with a concrete value above the cap. Addresses gemini high-priority review on PR #9318. * fix(iam): synchronize OIDCProvider JWKS cache fields jwksCache, jwksFetchedAt, resolvedJWKSUri, and discoveryFailed are mutated lazily on the first token-validate call and refreshed afterwards on TTL expiry. Multiple S3 requests can land here in parallel, so the writes were racing against subsequent reads on every other goroutine. resolvedJWKSUri/discoveryFailed inherited the same un-protected pattern when discovery shipped. Add sync.RWMutex; getPublicKey takes the read lock for the common cache-hit path and promotes to the write lock for misses + refreshes. fetchJWKSLocked / resolveJWKSUriLocked assume the write lock is held by the caller; fetchJWKS keeps the test-friendly entry point that acquires the lock itself. Addresses gemini high-priority review on PR #9318. * fix(iam): trim trailing slash + retry discovery after transient failure Two OIDC discovery edge cases reviewers flagged: 1. Issuer comparison was sensitive to trailing slashes. resolveJWKSUri trims them when building the discovery URL, but the doc.Issuer ↔ p.config.Issuer check did not, so an IDP whose issuer claim drops or adds the slash relative to the configured value would be falsely rejected. Trim a single trailing slash on each side before comparing. 2. discoveryFailed flipped to true on any error and stayed there for the process lifetime. A transient 5xx at startup permanently locked the provider into the /.well-known/jwks.json fallback. Reset the flag at the top of fetchJWKSLocked when no URI has been cached yet, so each JWKS refresh (typically once per TTL = 1h) reattempts discovery. Successful discovery remains cached via resolvedJWKSUri so we don't pay the discovery RTT on every refresh. Addresses gemini security-medium + medium reviews on PR #9318. * fix(iam): require non-empty issuer in OIDC discovery doc The previous "doc.Issuer != "" && ..." guard let a discovery document that omitted the issuer field bypass the issuer-mismatch check entirely, letting the doc steer fetchJWKS at any URL it provided. OIDC Discovery 1.0 §3 mandates the issuer field; treat missing as a hard failure same as mismatched. Trailing-slash equivalence still applies. Adds TestDiscoveryRejectsMissingIssuer alongside the existing TestDiscoveryRejectsIssuerMismatch via a new omitDiscoveryIssuer toggle on fakeIDP.
215 lines
7.2 KiB
Go
215 lines
7.2 KiB
Go
package sts
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import (
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/base64"
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"fmt"
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"time"
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"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
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)
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// ComputeParentUser returns a stable per-identity hash derived from the OIDC
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// (sub, iss) tuple. Only the (sub, iss) pair is guaranteed stable across token
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// refreshes per OpenID Connect Core 1.0 §5.7, so any per-user state (audit
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// logs, quotas) must key off this value rather than the access-key or session
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// id. The hash is base64-rawurl-encoded SHA-256 over "openid:<sub>:<iss>" so
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// it stays filesystem-safe and bounded in length for storage in audit paths.
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func ComputeParentUser(sub, iss string) string {
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if sub == "" {
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return ""
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}
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h := sha256.Sum256([]byte("openid:" + sub + ":" + iss))
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return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(h[:])
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}
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// defaultCredentialGenerator is a reusable instance for generating temporary credentials
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// Reusing a single instance across all calls to ToSessionInfo() reduces allocation overhead
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// since this method may be called frequently during signature verification
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var defaultCredentialGenerator = NewCredentialGenerator()
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// STSSessionClaims represents comprehensive session information embedded in JWT tokens
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// This eliminates the need for separate session storage by embedding all session
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// metadata directly in the token itself - enabling true stateless operation
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type STSSessionClaims struct {
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jwt.RegisteredClaims
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// Session identification
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SessionId string `json:"sid"` // session_id (abbreviated for smaller tokens)
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SessionName string `json:"snam"` // session_name (abbreviated for smaller tokens)
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TokenType string `json:"typ"` // token_type
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// Role information
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RoleArn string `json:"role"` // role_arn
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AssumedRole string `json:"assumed"` // assumed_role_user
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Principal string `json:"principal"` // principal_arn
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// Authorization data
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Policies []string `json:"pol,omitempty"` // policies (abbreviated)
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// SessionPolicy contains inline session policy JSON (optional)
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SessionPolicy string `json:"spol,omitempty"`
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// Identity provider information
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IdentityProvider string `json:"idp"` // identity_provider
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ExternalUserId string `json:"ext_uid"` // external_user_id
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ProviderIssuer string `json:"prov_iss"` // provider_issuer
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// Request context (optional, for policy evaluation)
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RequestContext map[string]interface{} `json:"req_ctx,omitempty"`
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// Session metadata
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AssumedAt time.Time `json:"assumed_at"` // when role was assumed
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MaxDuration int64 `json:"max_dur,omitempty"` // maximum session duration in seconds
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// ParentUser is a stable hash of (sub, iss) for tokens minted from an OIDC
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// identity. It survives token rotation since only the (sub, iss) tuple is
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// guaranteed stable per OpenID Connect Core 1.0. Empty for non-federated
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// session types.
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ParentUser string `json:"puid,omitempty"`
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}
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// NewSTSSessionClaims creates new STS session claims with all required information
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func NewSTSSessionClaims(sessionId, issuer string, expiresAt time.Time) *STSSessionClaims {
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now := time.Now()
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return &STSSessionClaims{
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RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
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Issuer: issuer,
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Subject: sessionId,
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IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
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ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(expiresAt),
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NotBefore: jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
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},
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SessionId: sessionId,
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TokenType: TokenTypeSession,
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AssumedAt: now,
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}
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}
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// ToSessionInfo converts JWT claims back to SessionInfo structure
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// This enables seamless integration with existing code expecting SessionInfo
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func (c *STSSessionClaims) ToSessionInfo() *SessionInfo {
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var expiresAt time.Time
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if c.ExpiresAt != nil {
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expiresAt = c.ExpiresAt.Time
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}
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// Generate temporary credentials from the session ID
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// This is deterministic based on the session ID, so the same credentials are regenerated
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credentials, err := defaultCredentialGenerator.GenerateTemporaryCredentials(c.SessionId, expiresAt)
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if err != nil {
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// Log the error with context - credential generation failure is important for debugging
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errMsg := fmt.Errorf("generate temporary credentials for session %s: %w", c.SessionId, err)
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glog.Warningf("Failed to generate credentials for STS session: %v", errMsg)
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// Return session info without credentials - validation will catch this as invalid
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credentials = nil
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}
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return &SessionInfo{
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SessionId: c.SessionId,
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SessionName: c.SessionName,
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RoleArn: c.RoleArn,
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AssumedRoleUser: c.AssumedRole,
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Principal: c.Principal,
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Policies: c.Policies,
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SessionPolicy: c.SessionPolicy,
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ExpiresAt: expiresAt,
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IdentityProvider: c.IdentityProvider,
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ExternalUserId: c.ExternalUserId,
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ProviderIssuer: c.ProviderIssuer,
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RequestContext: c.RequestContext,
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ParentUser: c.ParentUser,
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// Provide the Subject (sub) from registered claims
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Subject: c.Subject,
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Credentials: credentials,
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}
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}
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// IsValid checks if the session claims are valid (not expired, etc.)
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func (c *STSSessionClaims) IsValid() bool {
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now := time.Now()
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// Check expiration
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if c.ExpiresAt != nil && c.ExpiresAt.Before(now) {
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return false
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}
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// Check not-before
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if c.NotBefore != nil && c.NotBefore.After(now) {
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return false
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}
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// Ensure required fields are present
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if c.SessionId == "" || c.RoleArn == "" || c.Principal == "" {
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return false
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}
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return true
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}
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// GetSessionId returns the session identifier
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func (c *STSSessionClaims) GetSessionId() string {
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return c.SessionId
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}
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// GetExpiresAt returns the expiration time
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func (c *STSSessionClaims) GetExpiresAt() time.Time {
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if c.ExpiresAt != nil {
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return c.ExpiresAt.Time
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}
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return time.Time{}
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}
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// WithRoleInfo sets role-related information in the claims
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func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithRoleInfo(roleArn, assumedRole, principal string) *STSSessionClaims {
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c.RoleArn = roleArn
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c.AssumedRole = assumedRole
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c.Principal = principal
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return c
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}
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// WithPolicies sets the policies associated with this session
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func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithPolicies(policies []string) *STSSessionClaims {
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c.Policies = policies
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return c
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}
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// WithSessionPolicy sets the inline session policy JSON for this session
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func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithSessionPolicy(policy string) *STSSessionClaims {
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c.SessionPolicy = policy
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return c
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}
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// WithIdentityProvider sets identity provider information
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func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithIdentityProvider(providerName, externalUserId, providerIssuer string) *STSSessionClaims {
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c.IdentityProvider = providerName
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c.ExternalUserId = externalUserId
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c.ProviderIssuer = providerIssuer
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return c
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}
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// WithRequestContext sets request context for policy evaluation
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func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithRequestContext(ctx map[string]interface{}) *STSSessionClaims {
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c.RequestContext = ctx
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return c
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}
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// WithMaxDuration sets the maximum session duration
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func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithMaxDuration(duration time.Duration) *STSSessionClaims {
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c.MaxDuration = int64(duration.Seconds())
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return c
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}
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// WithSessionName sets the session name
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func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithSessionName(sessionName string) *STSSessionClaims {
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c.SessionName = sessionName
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return c
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}
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// WithParentUser sets the stable per-identity hash for the session. See
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// ComputeParentUser for the derivation rule.
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func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithParentUser(parentUser string) *STSSessionClaims {
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c.ParentUser = parentUser
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return c
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}
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