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feat(iam): STS web-identity AWS-fidelity polish (Phase 1) (#9318)
* feat(iam): STS web-identity AWS-fidelity polish - OIDC discovery via .well-known/openid-configuration; falls back to /.well-known/jwks.json when discovery is absent. Reject discovery docs whose issuer claim does not match the configured issuer to defend against issuer-substitution. - ComputeParentUser derives a stable per-identity hash from (sub, iss). Surface as aws:userid in the request context and as a parent_user claim in the session JWT so per-user state survives token rotation. - Per-role MaxSessionDuration (3600..43200) clamps requested DurationSeconds before the STS service applies its own caps. - Tighten RoleSessionName to the AWS contract: 2..64 chars from [\w+=,.@-]. - Populate PackedPolicySize in AssumeRole / AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity / AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity responses as a percentage of the 2048-byte inline session policy budget. * fix(iam): leave omitted DurationSeconds nil so STS default applies capDurationByRole was substituting the role's MaxSessionDuration when the caller omitted DurationSeconds entirely. AWS returns the configured default (typically 1 hour) in that case, not the role's upper bound — a 12h MaxSessionDuration shouldn't silently make every no-duration assume-role mint a 12h session. Return nil when requested is nil; let the downstream calculateSessionDuration in the STS service apply its TokenDuration default. The role-max upper bound still clamps when the request arrives with a concrete value above the cap. Addresses gemini high-priority review on PR #9318. * fix(iam): synchronize OIDCProvider JWKS cache fields jwksCache, jwksFetchedAt, resolvedJWKSUri, and discoveryFailed are mutated lazily on the first token-validate call and refreshed afterwards on TTL expiry. Multiple S3 requests can land here in parallel, so the writes were racing against subsequent reads on every other goroutine. resolvedJWKSUri/discoveryFailed inherited the same un-protected pattern when discovery shipped. Add sync.RWMutex; getPublicKey takes the read lock for the common cache-hit path and promotes to the write lock for misses + refreshes. fetchJWKSLocked / resolveJWKSUriLocked assume the write lock is held by the caller; fetchJWKS keeps the test-friendly entry point that acquires the lock itself. Addresses gemini high-priority review on PR #9318. * fix(iam): trim trailing slash + retry discovery after transient failure Two OIDC discovery edge cases reviewers flagged: 1. Issuer comparison was sensitive to trailing slashes. resolveJWKSUri trims them when building the discovery URL, but the doc.Issuer ↔ p.config.Issuer check did not, so an IDP whose issuer claim drops or adds the slash relative to the configured value would be falsely rejected. Trim a single trailing slash on each side before comparing. 2. discoveryFailed flipped to true on any error and stayed there for the process lifetime. A transient 5xx at startup permanently locked the provider into the /.well-known/jwks.json fallback. Reset the flag at the top of fetchJWKSLocked when no URI has been cached yet, so each JWKS refresh (typically once per TTL = 1h) reattempts discovery. Successful discovery remains cached via resolvedJWKSUri so we don't pay the discovery RTT on every refresh. Addresses gemini security-medium + medium reviews on PR #9318. * fix(iam): require non-empty issuer in OIDC discovery doc The previous "doc.Issuer != "" && ..." guard let a discovery document that omitted the issuer field bypass the issuer-mismatch check entirely, letting the doc steer fetchJWKS at any URL it provided. OIDC Discovery 1.0 §3 mandates the issuer field; treat missing as a hard failure same as mismatched. Trailing-slash equivalence still applies. Adds TestDiscoveryRejectsMissingIssuer alongside the existing TestDiscoveryRejectsIssuerMismatch via a new omitDiscoveryIssuer toggle on fakeIDP.
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@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
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package sts
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import (
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/base64"
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"fmt"
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"time"
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@@ -8,6 +10,20 @@ import (
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"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/glog"
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)
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// ComputeParentUser returns a stable per-identity hash derived from the OIDC
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// (sub, iss) tuple. Only the (sub, iss) pair is guaranteed stable across token
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// refreshes per OpenID Connect Core 1.0 §5.7, so any per-user state (audit
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// logs, quotas) must key off this value rather than the access-key or session
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// id. The hash is base64-rawurl-encoded SHA-256 over "openid:<sub>:<iss>" so
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// it stays filesystem-safe and bounded in length for storage in audit paths.
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func ComputeParentUser(sub, iss string) string {
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if sub == "" {
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return ""
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}
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h := sha256.Sum256([]byte("openid:" + sub + ":" + iss))
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return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(h[:])
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}
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// defaultCredentialGenerator is a reusable instance for generating temporary credentials
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// Reusing a single instance across all calls to ToSessionInfo() reduces allocation overhead
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// since this method may be called frequently during signature verification
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@@ -45,6 +61,12 @@ type STSSessionClaims struct {
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// Session metadata
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AssumedAt time.Time `json:"assumed_at"` // when role was assumed
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MaxDuration int64 `json:"max_dur,omitempty"` // maximum session duration in seconds
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// ParentUser is a stable hash of (sub, iss) for tokens minted from an OIDC
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// identity. It survives token rotation since only the (sub, iss) tuple is
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// guaranteed stable per OpenID Connect Core 1.0. Empty for non-federated
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// session types.
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ParentUser string `json:"puid,omitempty"`
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}
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// NewSTSSessionClaims creates new STS session claims with all required information
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@@ -96,6 +118,7 @@ func (c *STSSessionClaims) ToSessionInfo() *SessionInfo {
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ExternalUserId: c.ExternalUserId,
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ProviderIssuer: c.ProviderIssuer,
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RequestContext: c.RequestContext,
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ParentUser: c.ParentUser,
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// Provide the Subject (sub) from registered claims
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Subject: c.Subject,
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Credentials: credentials,
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@@ -182,3 +205,10 @@ func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithSessionName(sessionName string) *STSSessionClaims
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c.SessionName = sessionName
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return c
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}
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// WithParentUser sets the stable per-identity hash for the session. See
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// ComputeParentUser for the derivation rule.
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func (c *STSSessionClaims) WithParentUser(parentUser string) *STSSessionClaims {
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c.ParentUser = parentUser
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return c
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}
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